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As the 1990s begin, social security is once again at the center of public 
debate. Under current projections social security is expected to post 
substantial surpluses during the next two or three decades and a string 
of ever-increasing deficits thereafter. In the meantime the social se­
curity trust funds are projected to accumulate large reserves. At the 
heart of the current controversy is the question of how politicians will 
behave when the trust funds are temporarily flush with cash. Will the 
surplus funds actually be saved for future years, or will they be spent­
either directly through social security expansion or indirectly through 
an expansion of the rest of the budget? 
No binding rules on politicians dictate how surplus monies will be 
used. Under current law any excess revenues in the trust funds must be 
used to purchase new special-issue government bonds, but that does 
not reveal what is done with the revenues the Treasury has thus been 
lent. Excess social security revenues, like any other federal revenues, 
are available to finance the general operations of the government. They 
may be used to retire outstanding government debt or to finance an 
increase in federal spending or a reduction in federal taxes. 
How political discretion determines this fiscal choice is the subject 
of this chapter. If tax and spending decisions in the rest of the budget 
are independent of social security, then any excess social security rev­
enues reduce the federal budget deficit and allow the Treasury to retire 
outstanding privately held public debt. If po\iticians respond to the 
surplus social security revenues by increasing federal spending (or 
reducing federal taxes), then some or all of the surpluses translate into 
a higher deficit in the rest of the budget, with little or no reduction in 
the overall deficit or national debt. 
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The question of how politicians will use the surpluses in the com­
ing years cannot be settled by force of conviction or ideals about polit­
ical behavior. It is fundamentally an empirical question about the 
interrelationship between social security and other fiscal decisions. 
This chapter attempts to provide an empirical analysis of several 
key fiscal relationships and, in so doing, to inform the debate over the 
advance funding of social security. In particular an empirical technique 
known as causality testing is used to examine the relationships be­
tween social security revenues, trust fund balances, and aggregate fed­
eral spending and between social security revenues and other federal 
revenues. Some understanding about the actual historical relationships 
between these variables can help to make informed judgments about 
the likely effects of the social security surpluses. 
The remainder of the chapter first reviews previous empirical 
studies on the causal relationship between government taxation and 
spending, and the importance of testing the dynamic nature of political 
responses involving social security. Second, an empirical model is for­
mulated and empirical findings evaluated. Finally, results are analyzed 
in the context of current policy deliberations. 
The Importance of Dynamic Analysis 
Almost all solutions to fiscal problems follow from some prescribed 
change in spending or taxes under a static, or independent, framework. 
Economists have long argued for advance funding of social security 
under the assumption that doing so would not trigger behavior by 
politicians that would undermine the attainment of the stated goal: an 
increase in national saving. 
Economic or political behavior is seldom so simple. A dynamic 
framework of budgetary behavior-whether in the area of social secur­
ity spending or aggregate federal spending-recognizes at least four 
possibilities in a world of political discretion: tax decisions are in­
fluenced by expenditure decisions, expenditure decisions are influ­
enced by tax decisions, expenditure and tax decisions are unrelated, or 
expenditure and tax decisions are jointly determined. Static analysis of 
dynamic relationships can lead to an incorrect understanding of be­
havior and therefore to inappropriate policy recommendations. 
Only recently have economists recognized the importance of ana­
lyzing fiscal policy in a dynamic framework. Using a common method 
of determining causal relationships referred to as Granger causality 
testing, more than nine studies have attempted to establish the tax­
spend relationship at the federal, state, and local levels of government. 
While the results are not totally in agreement, the available studies 
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suggest that a dynamic analysis of governmental budget behavior is 
appropriate and that in an examination of the historical relationship 
between taxes and spending, the hypothesis that expenditures will rise 
whenever taxes rise cannot be reasonably rejected, and vice versa.! 
In this chapter this dynamic analysis is extended to social security. 
> Before one can evaluate the likely effects of the trust fund surpluses or 
offer appropriate solutions, one must understand the political dy­
namics behind social security and other federal revenue and spending 
decisions. The interrelationships between the primary policy param­
eters-social security revenues, trust fund balances, and aggregate fed­
eral spending, as well as between social security revenues and other 
federal revenues-are analyzed. The more one understands about the 
politics of federal fiscal behavior, the less ambiguous are the effects of 
proposed solutions, and the higher is the likelihood that policy goals 
are attained. 
The Budget Constraint Hypothesis and Social Security 
The early research on causality, which was motivated primarily by 
political debate on the federal budget, focused on the question, Does a 
tax increase unambiguously lower the deficit?2 On one side of the issue 
were those who argued that budget deficits were a symptom of fiscal 
irresponsibility and that tax increases were the appropriate solution. 
The other side, which was taken by many in the Reagan administra­
tion, agreed that the growth in federal budget deficits was a symptom 
of fiscal irresponsibility but argued that the appropriate solution was 
to lower spending.3 
The latter view is consistent with the budget constraint hypothesis 
discussed extensively by Milton Friedman.4 On the assumption that 
there always exists a worthwhile program that someone wishes to 
enact, the budget constraint model of government hypothesizes that 
revenues determine spending levels. This follows from standard mi­
croeconomic theory of the consumer: consumers operate with scarce 
resources and thus are limited in the amount they can consume. The 
limits of current consumption are determined by accumulated wealth, 
current income, and the ability to borrow on future resources, which 
together define the budget constraint. An expanded budget constraint 
allows for expanded consumption opportunities. 
The budget constraint hypothesis impli~s that the government, 
like individual consumers, is subject to scarce resources. (Were it not, 
we would have no difficulty removing poverty, hunger, homelessness, 
and many other problems from our broad and growing list of policy 
concerns.) The budget constraint facing government consists of the 
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means by which expenditures are funded: tax receipts and debt. Taxes 
are levied either directly through legislation or indirectly through infla­
tion. The deficit is the residual between collected taxes and current 
spending and determines new borrowing. Although only the central 
government has the power to create money, the government's ability 
to consume is constrained by the same factors that confront private 
citizens. 
The budget constraint analogy offers an organizing framework for 
relevant policy questions. One obvious question concerns the expected 
impact on government spending of a deficit reduction policy that in­
cludes raising taxes. With the budget constraint approach, raising 
taxes, by itself, serves to expand the spending opportunity set of gov­
ernment. This is really nothing new: Friedman has often repeated his 
famous maxim that "governments spend what governments receive 
plus whatever they can get away with."s The relevant question, then, 
becomes an empirical one: What does the evidence indicate about the 
effect of past tax increases on government expenditures? 
John Cogan presents an interesting variant of the budget con­
straint model that focuses on the dependence of budgetary decisions 
on the method of finance.6 His argument is developed in two parts. 
First, he likens the institutional arrangements in the congressional bud­
get process to a common property resource. The common resource is 
the general revenue fund. The problem is that when many congres­
sional committees draw on the general revenues, no single committee 
has an incentive to restrain its spending commitments. Even worse, 
since no single committee has any residual claim to unspent general 
funds, there is competition to outspend other committees. Consequent­
ly expenditures financed from general fund revenues increase much 
faster than the revenues themselves. 
Second, he argues that the creation of tax-financed trust funds, the 
first of which was social security, transferred spending authority from 
the appropriations committees to the tax-writing committees and 
thereby created a revenue bias in favor of trust fund taxes and against 
general fund taxes. Since the tax-writing committees have exclusive 
jurisdiction over trust fund expenditures (and taxes), it is easier for 
them to capture the political benefits of spending on these programs. In 
addition the proceeds of trust fund taxes (for example, the social se­
curity payroll tax) are tied more closely than general fund revenues to 
the interests of the tax-writing committees. This analytical framework 
suggests a substitution of trust fund revenues for general fund rev­
enues, with social security taxes funding a larger share of government 
overtime. 
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The opposing view to the budget constraint hypothesis argues that 
politicians are not self-serving spenders (or tax substituters) but rather 
are committed to living within their means. Here the possibility that 
tax increases could fund additional spending rather than reduce the 
deficit is either highly discounted or believed to be false as there is 
assumed to be no innate proclivity among politicians to use higher 
taxes to fund larger expenditures or new programs. This view there­
fore implies either that there is no causal relation between increased 
taxes and increased spending or that the true causal relation runs from 
spending to taxes. 
One's view of the budget constraint hypothesis greatly influences 
policy recommendations regarding the social security surpluses. The 
budget constraint hypothesis suggests that social security surpluses 
will lead to increases (decreases)-within and outside of social se­
curity-in federal spending (taxes). That is, since social security 
surpluses are really excess social security revenues, and there is no 
prohibition on the spending of these revenues, politicians will be in­
clined to increase other spending programs or trim other taxes rather 
than enjoy a lower federal budget deficit and national debt. If the 
budget constraint view of political behavior is correct, today's excess 
payroll taxes will not be saved for payouts of future social security 
benefits but will promote the relaxation of the budget constraint facing 
politicians. 
The major alternative hypothesis is that political behavior in the 
area of non-social-security spending and taxation is independent of 
social security spending and taxation. That is, social security surpluses, 
or excess taxes, will have no effect on the rest of the budget, leading 
instead to a reduction in the overall federal 'deficit and the amount of 
federal debt held by the public. This is the usual argument for running 
surpluses in the first place, and it assumes that politicians resist all 
temptations to spend the new resources at their command. 
The Granger causality test is one way to test which hypothesis 
regarding political decisions is correce Based on the predictability of a 
variable over time, Granger causality attempts to determine whether 
the forecasts of a variable Y, such as government spending, using both 
past values of itself and that of another variable X, such as social 
security surpluses, are better than forecasts based solely on lagged 
values of Y. If so, then X is said to one-way cause Y. If it is found that X 
causes Yand that Ycauses X, then two-way causality exists between X 
and Y. Finally, if one-way causality does not exist in either direction, 
the fourth possibility exists: the variables bear no causal relation to one 
another and are truly independent. 
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Empirical Evidence of Tax-Spend Causality 
The available empirical evidence generally supports the view that gov­
ernment tax and spending decisions are causally related. Of the nine or 
more studies that directly test for causality, the majority find evidence 
of dependence between revenue and spending decisions. Neela Man­
age and Michael L. Marlow tested for causality in federal finances over 
the period 1929 to 1982.8 In seven of the twelve cases studied (or 58 
percent) they found bidirectional causality; in the remaining cases (42 
percent) they found one-way causality running from budget receipts to 
budget outlays. This study concludes that even in the case of bidirec­
tionality, one cannot reject the hypothesis that tax increases will be 
associated with subsequent spending increases. Using a similar frame­
work, Rati Ram offers additional support for these results.9 David Joul­
faian provides evidence of two-way, or simultaneous, causality 
between federal taxes and spending.IO 
Paul R. Blackley uses causality tests on the federal tax-spend rela­
tion over the period 1929-1982.11 He concludes that while it is not 
possible to reject the hypothesis that the 'tax-spend relationship is 
simultaneous, revenue growth appears to bear a much stronger causal 
link to spending growth than vice versa. 
Marlow and Manage address the issue of whether the many dif­
ferent legislative and constitutional constraints at the state and local 
levels of government affect the causal relation between revenues and 
expenditures.12 At the state level the evidence supports the budget 
constraint hypothesis. At the local level the evidence suggests no caus­
ality. Further testing of the same data by Abdur R. Chowdhry provides 
evidence that supports the budget constraint hypothesis at the local 
levelP Evidence of similar causality at the local level is also found by 
Douglas Holtz-Eakin.14 
To date, only two studies do not support the budget constraint 
hypothesis. William Anderson, Myles S. Wallace, and John T. Warner 
find one-way causality running from real federal spending to real fed­
eral tax revenues.IS In a study of quarterly federal tax and spending 
data, George M. von Furstenburg, Jeffrey R. Green, and Jin-Ho Jeogn 
find no significant relationship between spending and taxes.16 Bud­
getary decisions, however, are made on an annual basis, so the use of 
quarterly data introduces many potential trouble spots concerning rev­
enue and expenditure flows that have little, or possibly nothing, to do 
with annual political budgetary decisions.17 
In sum, while the empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, most 
studies indicate one-way causality running from taxes to spending and 
therefore yield strong support for the budget constraint hypothesis. 
124 
CRAIN AND MARLOW 
Only one study shows causality in the other direction. The possibility 
that causality is complex, or bidirectional, should not be dismissed, 
however. While the budget constraint hypothesis appears to be at least 
partially correct, the alternative hypothesis may contain some validity 
as well.l8 The advantage of causality testing is that it does not impose 
any assumptions on behavior or causality; rather it tests for causal 
relations. This empirical approach allows both proponents and skep­
tics of the budget constraint hypothesis their day in court. 
The important similarity between the federal tax and spending 
relation and the relation between social security and the federal budget 
is the existence of political discretion. Both relationships are uncon­
strained by rules. Therefore one cannot make a priori assumptions that 
are known to be correct about how a surplus of social security funds 
will be used. This chapter attempts to shed light on how politicians are 
likely to respond to social security's looming surpluses. 
Empirical Tests. The data used in the causality tests are drawn from 
the 1989 U.S. budget. For the period 1940 to 1987, data are used for total 
(on- and off-budget) federal revenues and expenditures, and on social 
security revenues, expenditures, and reserves.19 Social security is de­
fined to include all four programs or trust funds: Old-Age and Sur­
vivors Insurance, Disability Insurance, Hospital Insurance, and Sup­
plemental Medical Insurance. The reserve in any particular year is 
equal to the accumulated assets of the four trust funds as of the end of 
the fiscal year. These data are used to compute non-social-security 
expenditures (revenues), which are simply aggregate federal spending 
(revenues) less social security spending (revenues). The annual surplus 
or deficit in social security, referred to as the trust fund balance, is 
computed from the one-year change in trust fund reserves. The trust 
fund balances (rather than reserves) are emphasized here because they 
closely indicate, at the margin, the potential for changes in political 
discretionary spending opportunities. 
Three technical issues should be considered before evaluating the 
empirical estimations. First, there are serial correlation problems in 
data on levels, such as annual federal expenditures, that must be cor­
rected before using the Granger test. (The Granger test requires that 
each time series be stationary. The relationship between any two obser­
vations depends only on the time interval between them and not on 
time itself; most time series of level data contain some type of trend.) 
To handle this problem, the data were first-differenced: the value of the 
previous observation was subtracted from each observation. All the 
data were then transformed into annual growth rates, with additional 
first-differences taken until the time trend was eliminated.20 The data 
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TABLE 6-1
TRIVARIATE CAUSALITY TESTS BETWEEN SOCIAL SECURITY REVENUES,
FEDERAL SPENDING, AND SOCIAL SECURITY BALANCES 
Hypothesis 
FS =f(FS, SR) 
(SB causesFS) 
SR =f (SR, FS) 
(SB causes SR) 
SB =f(SB,FS) 
(SR causes SB) 
Lag F 1:SB F 1:SB F 1:SR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0.96 
4.01" 
4.93b 
2.13c 
3.23a 
0.15 
0.98 
-LIsa 
2.12 
-2.13a 
2.43 
-2.63a 
2.10 
-3.03c 
1.98 
1.85 
1.64 
2.37c 
1.36 
1.28 
0.11 
1.36 
-0.41 
1.51 
-l.01a 
2.07 
-1.00 
1.29 
-1.49 
1.24 
1.14 
3.71a 
0.93 
0.30 
0.45 
-0.13 
1.07 
-0.25 
1.17 
-0040 
1.10 
-0.45 
0.78 
-0.72 
0.83 
FS =f (FS, SB) 
(SR causes FS) 
SR =f (SR, SB) 
(FS causes SR) 
SB =f(SB, SR) 
(FS causes SB) 
F 1:SR F :EFS F :EFS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2.83c 
3.79a 
5.38b 
4.90b 
4.46b 
0.47c 
1.68 
1.33a 
2.41 
2.22c 
2.80 
3.37b 
3.24 
2.39c 
1.72 
0.01 
1048 
2.98a 
1.99 
1.58 
-om 
0.09 
0.15 
1.65 
0.18 
1.39 
0.12 
0.61 
0.25 
0.75 
0.17 
lAO 
0.73 
0.25 
0.19 
-0.03 
0.41 
0.59 
0.82 
0.11 
1.04 
0.06 
0.35 
0.08 
0.30 
FS=f(FS) 
(SR&SB cause FS) 
SR =f(SR) 
(FS&SB cause SR) 
SB =f(SB) 
(FS&SR cause SB) 
F F F 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
3.21c 
3.13a 
4.28b 
2.74a 
3.18b 
1.03 
1.46 
2.31c 
1.67 
1.58 
0.73 
2.19c 
0.61 
0.27 
0.30 
SR = social security revenues 
FS = total federal spending 
SB = social security trust fund balances 
a. Significant at the .05 level (absolute value of t-statistic below 1:). 
b. Significant at the .01 level (absolute value of t-statistic below 1:). 
c. Significant at the .10 level (absolute value of t-statistic below 1:). 
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on trust fund reserves required third-differencing; all other data re­
quired second-differencing. 
The transformed data can be interpreted as follows. Social security 
revenues, non-social-security revenues, total federal expenditures, and 
non-social-security expenditures are measured as changes in annual 
growth rates. Since the first-difference of social security trust fund 
reserves is the current period's trust fund balance (surplus or deficit), 
the second-difference is the growth rate of the trust fund balance and 
the third-difference is the change in the growth rate of the trust fund 
balance. Therefore, causality tests will identify the causal relationships 
between changes in the growth rate of social security revenues, trust 
fund balances, and federal spending. 
Second, there are differing views regarding the appropriate lag 
length to use in a causality test. Symmetric lags, ranging from one to 
five years, were used here.21 
Third, two statistics of interest in this application of Granger caus­
ality tests are provided. One is the F-statistic, which is used to test the 
null hypothesis that all coefficients on the independent variables are 
zero.22 Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that at least some 
subset of independent variables exerts a statistically significant effect 
on the dependent variable. The other statistic is the sum of the coeffi­
cients (I,).23 A t-test on the sum of the coefficients indicates whether the 
causal effects on the dependent variable are permanent or transitory in 
nature and in what direction as evidenced by the sign on the sum of 
coefficients. 
Table 6-1 presents the results of a trivariate causality test between 
total federal spending (FS), social security revenues (SR), and trust 
fund balances (SB). Since there are three variables of interest, a tri­
variate causality approach is used here to understand how their past 
values are related to one another. Three causal orderings are possible: 
one or more variables one-way cause one or more variables, all vari­
ables experience tridirectional causality (that is, they are simultaneous­
ly related), or none of the variables are causally related to another. 
The F-scores displayed in the first column are associated with the 
null hypothesis that social security revenues or trust fund balances are 
significantly related to aggregate federal spending. The number 0.96, 
for example, in the first column and first row is the F-score associated 
with the hypothesis that SB is significantly related to FS. It is obtained 
by comparing the sum of squared residuals ,(SSRs) of the two equa­
tions: FS = f(FS, SR, SB) and FS = f(FS, SR). The displayed F-score is 
obtained from the usual calculation that determines whether the 
change in SSRs is statistically different from zero. If the F-score exceeds 
the appropriate F-statistic, then SB is significantly related to FS. The 
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F-scores in the middle of the first column refer to the comparison 
between FS =!(FS, SR, SB) and FS =!(FS, SB); it is associated with the 
null hypothesis that SR is not statistically related to FS. 
Next to the F-scores are the sums of coefficients (2,) relating to the 
previous test of significance. As mentioned, the F-test is appropriate for 
testing whether all independent variables exert statistically significant 
effects on a dependent variable. The t-test on the sum of coefficients is 
appropriate for testing whether the independent variable exerts a per­
manent effect. The sum of coefficients is displayed along with its as­
sociated t-score below it. If the t-score exceeds its critical level, then the 
independent variable exerts a permanent effect on the dependent vari­
able. Failure to exceed its critical level indicates that any effects are 
transitory in nature. 
The results indicate that neither social security revenues nor trust 
fund balances are significantly explained by past values of any three o! 
the variables. That is, with the equation of SR as the dependent vari­
able, the F-scores associated with the influence of past values of FS and 
SB are generally not statistically different from zero. The only excep­
tions occur when three-year lags are used; even here, though, the F­
scores are only marginally significant at the 10 percent level for the 
tests involving SB by itself and FS and SB together. Moreover, the only 
permanent effect from SB on SR is when it is by itself with the three­
year lag specification; in this case it is a negative effect implying that 
past increases in SB have exerted an inverse influence on SR. When SB 
is the dependent variable, SR exerts a negative effect only with the 
two-year lag specification; the effect, however, is not permanent. 
The equations with aggregate federal spending as the dependent 
variable indicate that both social security revenues and trust fund bal­
ances exert significant influences. Moreover, in most cases those effects 
are permanent. The results indicate that while past increases in SB 
exert negative effects on FS, past increases in SR exert positive effects. 
That is, the positive permanent coefficient on SR is empirical support 
for the tax-and-spend hypothesis. Here it is interpreted as indicating 
that past increases in social security revenues have exerted positive 
effects on total federal spending. In addition the permanent negative 
coefficient on SB indicates that past increases in trust fund balances 
have exerted inverse effects on total federal spending. 
The implications for causality are as follows. There appears to be 
little evidence that social security revenues and trust fund balances are 
related to (or cause) past changes in themselves or to past changes in 
total federal spending. Past changes in social security revenues and 
trust fund balances, however, explain (or cause) significant movements 
in aggregate federal spending. The evidence thus suggests that over the 
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period examined, causation runs from social security revenues and 
trust fund balances to aggregate federal spending. That is, past move­
ments in trust fund balances and revenues explain current aggregate 
federal spending and not vice versa. Therefore tax and spending de­
. cisions are causal in nature, with changes in social security revenues 
and trust fund balances leading to (causing) changes in federal spend­
ing. 
Table 6-2 is similar to table 6-1 except that total federal spending 
is disaggregated into its social security and non-social-security com­
ponents. This allows an additional test within the causality framework. 
Comparison of tables 6-1 and 6-2 indicates that as before, past move­
ments in social security revenues and trust fund balances have led to, 
or caused, non-social-security spending. Moreover, past increases in 
social security revenues have caused increases in non-social-security 
spending. 
Additional Tests of Causality 
While there is support for the budget constraint hypothesis in the case 
of the prospending effects of past increases in social security revenues, 
there is also evidence that past changes in the growth of trust fund 
balances have exerted negative and statistically significant effects on 
federal spending. One possible explanation for this latter result is that 
surplus monies in the trust funds are actually being saved, thus reduc­
ing the amount that the federal government must borrow and the 
amount of spending that is needed to service the government's debt. 
This explanation, however, conflicts with the above empirical support 
for the budget constraint hypothesis regarding past social security 
revenues and federal spending. In addition it conflicts with the finding 
that trust fund surpluses are not causally related to social security 
revenues or federal spending. Therefore the evidence in support of the 
argument that excess social security trust fund balances are saved and 
not spent is weak or nonexistent. 
The results reported in tables 6-1 and 6-2 also indicate that neither 
federal spending nor trust fund balances are causally related to social 
security revenues. As such, the empirical relationship between trust 
fund balances and federal spending does not appear to be related in 
any causal fashion to increased social security revenues. Rather the 
relationship appears to be associated with the other determinant of 
trust fund balances: social security spending. 
Table 6-3 contains the results of various bivariate causality tests 
that seek to determine why there exists an inverse causal relationship 
running from social security trust fund balances to federal spending. 
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TABLE 6-2
TRIVARIATE CAUSALITY TESTS BETWEEN SOCIAL SECURITY REVENUES,
NON-SOCIAL-SECURITY SPENDING, AND SOCIAL SECURITY BALANCES
Hypothesis 
NFS == !(FS, SR) 
(SB causes NFS) 
SR == ! (SR, NFS) 
(SB causes SR) 
SB ==! (SB, NFS) 
(SR causes SB) 
Lag F I.SB F I.SB F I.SR 
1 
2 
0.82 
3.87a 
0.14 
0.91 
-1.18a 
1.82 
1.66 
0.11 
1.35 
-0.42 
1.14 
3.74a 
-0.13 
1.07 
-0.25 
3 
4 
5 
4.82b 
2.09 
3.22a 
2.12 
-2.09a 
2.32 
-2.64a 
2.08 
-1.98a 
3.13 
2.34c 
1.34 
1.30 
1.53 
-1.02a 
2.08 
-1.04 
1.35 
-1.61 
1.34 
0.90 
0.31 
0.46 
1.15 
-0.38 
1.05 
-0.45 
0.77 
-0.81 
0.69 
NFS == ! (FS, SB) 
(SR causes NFS) 
SR == ! (SR, SB) 
(NFS causes SR) 
SB =!(SB, SR) 
(NFS causes SB) 
F I.SR F I.NFS F I.NFS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
3.47b 0.52c 
1.86 
4.14a 1.37a 
2.44 
5.68b 2.35b 
2.91 
5.06b 3.96b 
3.25 
4.44b 2.49c 
1.74 
NFS==!(NFS) 
(SR&SB cause NFS) 
0.03 -0.01 
0.02 
1.42 0.14 
1.60 
2.83c 0.18 
1.39 
1.90 0.12 
0.60 
1.51 0.24 
0.73 
SR == !(SR) 
(NFS&SB cause SR) 
0.28 -0.33 
0.53 
1.37 0.05 
0.71 
0.65 0.10 
0.98 
0.27 0.05 
0.32 
0.21 0.07 
0.27 
SB == !(SB) 
(NFS&SR cause SB) 
F F F 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
3.52a 
3.26a 
4.40b 
2.86a 
3.32b 
1.04 
1.43 
2.23c 
1.62 
1.54 
0.79 
2.17c 
0.56 
0.28 
0.32 
SR == social security revenues
NFS == net federal spending (total federal spending minus social security spend­
ing)
SB == social security trust fund balances
a. Significant at the .05 level (absolute value of t-statistic below I.). 
b. Significant at the .01 level (absolute value of t-statistic below I.). 
c. Significant at the .10 level (absolute value of t-statistic below I.). 
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TABLE 6-3 
BIVARIATE CAUSALITY TESTS OF ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 
5B causes 55 55 causes 5B 
Lag F F 
2 6.57a 0.49 
3 6.29a 0.20 
4 1.89 0.38 
5 0.98 0.23 
5B causesNI NI causes 5B 
F F 
2 0.21 1.55 
3 0.34 1.35 
4 0.16 2.61b 
5 2.19b 1.87 
5B causes NNI NNI causes 5B 
F F 
2 0.23 6.88a 
3 1.16 2.33b 
4 1.87 1.40 
5 0.55 1.63 
5B causes OEF OEF causes 5B 
F F 
2 0.01 0.19 
3 0.38 1.60 
4 0.68 1.09 
5 0.74 1.07 
5B causes NOEF NOEF causes 5B 
F F 
2 0.03 0.52 
3 0.30 1.39 
4 0.75 1.01 
5 0.73 0.88 
5B = social security trust fund balances 
NI = net interest,(on- and off-budget) of u.s. government 
NNI = NI - intragovernmental interest receipts of social security trust funds 
OEF = federal budget deficit (on- and off-budget) 
NOEF = OEF - intragovernmental interest receipts of social security trust funds 
55 = social security outlays 
a. Significant at the .01 level. 
b. Significant at the .10 level. 
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The first set of causality tests are between the trust fund balances (5B) 
and social security spending (55). After second-differencing the data 
on spending, there is evidence of a permanent inverse one-way causal 
relationship running from the trust fund balances to social security 
spending for the first two lag configurations. In other words the nega­
tive effect of the trust fund balances on federal spending appears to be 
related in part to their influence on social security spending. 
While this may appear to run counter to the budget constraint 
hypothesis, the inverse relationship between federal spending and 
trust fund balances may be spurious, stemming from a mechanical 
problem that is unrelated to political behavior.24 When an independent 
variable is jointly determined, as is clearly the case with trust fund 
balances, its coefficient can be difficult to interpret. 
This problem does not arise in the causality tests using non-social­
security spending, so one might argue that the evidence indicates that 
the budget constraint theory of political behavior is not supported by 
the past relationship between trust fund balances and non-social-se­
curity federal spending. This possibility deserves further testing since, 
if it is valid, it may place in doubt the earlier result concerning the 
positive one-way causal relationship running from social security rev­
enues to federal spending. 
To submit the data to further scrutiny, the counter hypothesis­
that trust fund surpluses reduce interest payments to the public by 
reducing the amount of outstanding debt-is tested. Stated another 
way, past social security surpluses have not relaxed fiscal restraint in 
the rest of the budget. To test this, a bivariate causality test is per­
formed between the net interest payments (on- and off-budget) of the 
U.S. government (ND and the trust fund balances (5B).25 The results are 
reported in table 6-3. After first-differencing the data on net interest, 
there is no permanent causal relationship between the two variables, 
suggesting that this hypothesis does not appear to have any empirical 
basis. As an additional test of the same hypothesis, net interest less 
interest receipts of the social security trust funds (NND was also con­
sidered. Mter first-differencing this data, the results of the causality 
test did not change. Social security trust fund balances bear no causal 
relationship to this adjusted measure of net interest. 
Finally, the counter hypothesis-that social security surpluses 
cause, or lead to, federal government savings-is tested. Rather than a 
look at the effect of trust fund balances on the interest payment portion 
of the federal budget, their effect on the overall budget deficit is direct­
ly examined. 
Two measures of the total (on- and off-budget) federal deficit are 
considered: DEF and NDEF. DEF is simply the difference between total 
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federal spending and total federal revenues.26 NDEF is defined as DEF 
less the interest receipts of the trust funds. After first-differencing both 
measures of federal deficits, the results in table 6-3 indicate that there 
exists no causal relationship between social security trust fund balan­
ces and either measure of the federal budget deficit. Therefore, the past 
relationship between these variables appears to be one of indepen­
dence. This finding is not supportive of the counterhypothesis that the 
social security surpluses are saved. 
Summary of the Empirical Evidence 
The evidence in tables 6-1 and 6-2 provides support for the budget 
constraint hypothesis that past increases in social security revenues 
have led to an increase in federal spending. The evidence also indicates 
that there has been a historical one-way inverse causal relationship 
running from social security trust fund balances to federal spending. 
While the latter may appear inconsistent with the budget constraint 
hypothesis, however, it may stem from an empirical problem of includ­
ing social security balances and social security spending in the same 
equation. Moreover, while some may wish to suggest that this inverse 
causal relation serves to invalidate the budget constraint hypothesis, 
the empirical evidence in table 6-3 does not contain any verification of 
the usual counterarguments to the budget constraint hypothesis. Spe­
cifically there is no evidence to support the view that social security 
surpluses lead to lower federal spending, interest payments, or 
deficits.27 
Conclusions 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to determine whether there 
should be concern that the projected surpluses of the social security 
trust funds might be spent rather than saved. Since there exist no 
written, or binding, constraints on the behavior of politicians concern­
ing this issue, the answer to this important question cannot be 
projected with great certainty. At best, predictions can be based on the 
assumption that past political behavior is a good guide to the future, 
and to do so, causality tests between the primary policy variables can 
be employed. 
The empirical evidence provides support for the budget constraint 
theory of political behavior: increased revenues will be treated as a 
general loosening of the budget constraint facing politicians. In periods 
when social security revenues have grown, there is a causal link to 
expansions in federal spending-both aggregate federal spending and 
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non-social-security spending. This suggests that the decision to raise 
revenues in the 1983 Social Security Amendments will lead to an ex­
pansion in federal spending. 
There is also evidence that both social security taxes and non-so­
cial-security taxes fund non-social-security programs. While taxpayers 
may operate on the assumption that social security taxes fund only 
social security spending, 'it appears that "a tax is a tax," when it comes 
to the tendency to expand government spending. 
Notwithstanding the attempt to make predictions based on actual 
historical relations, there remains great uncertainty over future politi­
cal behavior. This is merely a restatement of the fact that political 
decisions involving the use of social security surpluses are not subject 
to binding constraints. Given the importance that many place on social 
security, the replacement of political discretion with rules of conduct is 
suggested for the future relationships between social security taxes, 
trust fund balances, and aggregate federal spending and taxation. Ab­
sent such rules, guesses will continue about the future relationships 
between these important policy variables. 
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